Tusk, who will complete his second and final term as Council president at the end of November, said he wanted his visit to North Macedonia to showcase his support. Of course, anybody can at anytime and anywhere do more, especially when it comes to implementation. Given the heavy focus in Brussels on the U.
But he also urged patience and forbearance. And as a dedicated runner, I know what I am talking about. To reach the finish line, continued strength, endurance and focus is needed. And sometimes, I should also say, patience. I have no doubt that North Macedonia possesses more than enough of all these qualities. And everyone should appreciate it. Log in to access content and manage your profile. If you do not have a login you can register here. Some 7, police were mobilized in anticipation of marches in French capital.
EU nationals have predominantly been employed in manufacturing, hospitality, food, social care and construction In the first quarter of , there were an estimated 2. But the predictive maintenance strategy discussed by Metz already has the digital infrastructure — as do modern airplanes — to enable the future utilization of artificial intelligence for data mining by the Air France KLM. After the UK and Germany, the next highest inflows were seen in Spain and Switzerland, with , and 98, respectively. If those quotas could not be filled by those from the EU, they could be offered to non-EU nationals. Yet despite a referendum campaign in which immigration was a central focus, and a subsequent general election, these issues remain remarkably under-discussed. About this book The transition process of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which started more than a decade ago, has been the focus of much attention for both practitioners and scholars.
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State of the Art Report. Available online. EU Labour Migration since Enlargement. Trends, Impacts and Policies. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. Braun, Michael, and Arsene, Camelia. In Recchi, Ettore, and Favell, Adrian, eds. Pioneers of European Integration. Citizenship and Mobility in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, Carmel, Emma. Migration and Welfare in the New Europe. Social Protection and the Challenges of Integration.
Bristol: Policy Press, European Commission. Geographical and Labour Market Mobility. Employment in Europe Public Opinion in the European Union. European Integration Consortium. Final Report. Luxembourg: Eurostat. Statistics and Reality. Concepts and Measurements of Migration in Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Favell, Adrian. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. DOI: Favell, Adrian, and Recchi, Ettore. Leeds: Corporate Document Services. Lessons from Migration after EU Enlargement. IZA Discussion Papers King, Russel. Koikkalainen, Saara. No Entry. Immigration Policy in Europe.
Series D: Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. Krieger, Hubert. Migration Trends in an Enlarged Europe. Quality of Life in Europe Series. Lundborg, Per. Recchi, Ettore. Trends, Puzzles and Consequences. Recchi, Ettore, and Triandafyllidou, Anna. Menz and A.
Rusu, Ioana. Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Zaizeva, Anzelika, and Zimmermann, Klaus F. Skip to main content. Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present. Adjust Font. April 21, By Saara Koikkalainen. The ONS argue this discrepancy is explained almost entirely by short-term migration. These figures are significant for two reasons. First, they suggest a problem with the way we define and measure net migration. Our current definition — as defined by the International Passenger Survey — is somebody who comes here intending to stay for more than a year.
This system was designed for a different age, in which most of our migration originated from Commonwealth countries, whereby migrants were required to obtain a work visa and planned to come for several years.
But for EU nationals, there is no legal or practical obligation to stay for any length of time. Some will have a vague intention to stay. Others will and do change their minds once they arrive. The labour market figures cited above suggest current migration statistics mask a very large increase in short-term and circular migration.
Post-accession migration¹ from Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter CEE) is unique in that it grew in many cases to become massive and spontaneous in a. This volume presents new research on post-accession migration from Central and Eastern Europe in the short period since the EU enlargements of and.
According to conventional wisdom, temporary migration is less problematic than permanent migration, since it enables the government to meet employer demand without adding to the long-term resident population. It is, for example, striking that the group where the discrepancy between estimates of long-term migration and National Insurance Registrations is greatest are Romanian migrants. EU nationals have predominantly been employed in manufacturing, hospitality, food, social care and construction. In the first quarter of , there were an estimated 2.
Of these, around , were working in manufacturing, , were working in wholesale, retail or repair of vehicles, , were working in accommodation and food services, , were working in health and social care, and , were working in construction. Within the broad industry sections shown in the table above, the industry divisions with the largest numbers of EU national workers were retail, food and beverage service activities, education, manufacture of food products, human health activities and construction of buildings.
Whilst the largest number of these jobs are found in London, there are also significant numbers of EU migrants working in the South East, East of England and the North West. Why employers chose to recruit and employ EU migrants is itself not a straightforward question. Public policies have often incentivised — and in some cases left little choice for — employers to respond to shortages through the employment of migrant workers. A good example is social care. Shortages of UK care workers are largely a function of low wages and poor working conditions, which itself is a consequence of steadily increasing pressure on local authority budgets.
This has resulted in a growing demand for low-waged flexible workers, increasingly from within the EU as policies towards care workers from non-EU countries have become more restrictive. Post-Brexit, the government could decide to enable care providers to carry on hiring migrant workers as a way to keep prices low, increasing the availability of care at reduced cost. Alternatively, the government could choose to allocate more public spending to social care, with the explicit objective of turning it into a higher wage, higher productivity occupation.
Simply curtailing the supply of EU nationals into the care sector will do nothing to address the factors that give rise to the demand for those workers in the first place. In recent years, it has been asserted that the majority of EU migrants arriving in the UK have been employed in low skilled jobs. The truth is more nuanced than that. Part of the confusion arises from the way in which the government have chosen to classify what counts as a low skilled job.
These groupings are as follows:. The statistics for EU migrants as a whole were calculated by weighting the skill levels for each nationality group in the table by the number of people in that nationality group employed in the UK which can be obtained from Table 2 of the same release. There is wide variation between the labour market outcomes of different types of EU migrants. These figures do not necessarily imply that EU8 and EU2 nationals have a lower professional skill level than UK workers. On the contrary, as the graph below demonstrates, EU migrants are around twice as likely as UK workers to be over-educated for the job they are in.
However, we lack the data to test this. EU migration has benefitted the economy overall, though this masks distributional effects at the top and bottom of the income spectrum. The impact of EU migration on productivity and hence per capita growth is more contested. It has been argued that EU migration is likely to have depressed per capita growth because the availability of relatively low paid, but flexible workers reduces the incentive to invest in productivity-enhancing business models, including up-skilling of UK workers.
In contrast, other economists have argued that migration actually boosts productivity and per capita GDP. EU nationals are around a third less likely to claim out-of-work benefits than UK citizens, though they are more likely to claim in-work benefits, like tax credits. Similarly, the evidence shows the net fiscal impact of EU migration is positive overall. Various polling conducted in the run-up to and aftermath of the referendum make clear that immigration was a significant factor in the decision to leave the EU.
On the contrary, a new British Social Attitudes report makes clear that the public has, on balance, actually become more positive about the benefits of immigration, but also more selective on who they wish to see migrate. By this had changed, to the extent that the proportion with a positive view of its impact were 4 points ahead. During this period, the public have not noticeably become more or less keen on restrictions to migrant numbers.
However, they are more selective. Second, the public are more attuned to the trade-offs involved in Brexit than is often acknowledged. A poll conducted by YouGov three weeks after the general election found that when people are asked to consider free movement as a trade-off for single market access, British voters are broadly pragmatic. Similar levels of support exist for a trade-off when voters are offered the option of other limitations on free movement in exchange for Single Market access.
Third, there is growing evidence that concern about immigration may be more place-specific than previously understood. Whilst areas with a large proportion of settled migrants e. London were more likely to vote to remain, the areas that saw the most rapid population changes i. This analysis suggests that the migration that followed the EU enlargement affected parts of the UK that had previously been untouched by migration, particularly migration from the EU.
The majority of Eastern Europeans did not move to London, which prior to , had absorbed more than half of Eastern European migrants. In such areas, EU migration became subsequently associated with growing economic and cultural insecurity. The story of EU migration to the UK since is not as straightforward as the conventional wisdom is often portrayed. These nuances will have far-reaching implications for the policy choices facing the UK government over the next 12 months, with regards free movement reform. Yet despite a referendum campaign in which immigration was a central focus, and a subsequent general election, these issues remain remarkably under-discussed.
With the government about to embark on the most complex set of negotiations since the end of the Second World War, they urgently need to be the subject of scrutiny and debate. Contrary to popular perception, free movement did not begin as an absolute right, but has evolved over time, following various Treaties and Directives. The concept of free movement of persons has changed in meaning since its inception. Over time, the principle of free movement of persons has been extended to other groups, such as jobseekers, students and individuals who are self-sufficient for example, retirees.
This has happened as a result of treaty change, secondary legislation and evolving case law. In particular, the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in , introduced the notion of EU citizenship. The Citizens Directive sought to consolidate and codify in one instrument provisions on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within EU Member States.
During the s, the European Court of Justice arguably stretched its mandate to the limit by extending the right of free movement beyond what Member States had originally intended. In recent years, there have been calls, most notably in Germany and France, to amend the Posted Workers Directive to ensure that posted workers receive the same pay and conditions as local staff.
Although in practice, free movement of persons amounts to an immigration policy, Member States signed up to it in pursue of a different aim, namely the development of the Common Market. Accordingly, the legal basis in EU law for free movement of persons is found in provisions relating to the Single Market, not in provisions relating to immigration policy. This has profound implications for the approach taken by the UK in negotiating Brexit i. The Prime Minister has been clear that free movement will end, but she has been less clear about the objectives and constraints that will shape her choices.
Previously, ministers have conflated three overlapping, but nonetheless distinct objectives in approaching the negotiations:. In practice of course, the UK is not pursuing these objectives in a vacuum. It is thus likely that concessions on free movement would be traded against concessions in other parts of the negotiation, such as on access to the Single Market. Second, the need to ensure that any reforms to free movement themselves do not disproportionately damage the British economy.
Certain sectors, for example, agriculture, hospitality and finance, are highly dependent on access to migrant labour from within the EU and would be faced by severe labour shortages were the supply to suddenly be cut off. Third, the need to protect the rights of UK nationals seeking to move to the EU.
Any deal on migration will be reciprocal in scope, and so will affect the rights of UK nationals to reside and work in other EU countries. Post-election, with the government having lost its majority, it is no longer clear which of the objectives cited above still hold. In recent weeks, government ministers have suggested that there may be an emerging consensus around the need for a period of transition, 39 Even the issue of transition appears not to be collectively agreed.
A leaked Home Office paper on free movement did little to clarify matters, suggesting the government is unrealistic about the terms of transition and undecided on the future shape of a post-Brexit immigration system. This lack of clarity is unsustainable. The choices and trade-offs facing the UK in negotiating free movement reform need to be clearly exposed and debated, rather than hidden from view. In recent years, European leaders have been keen to stress the indivisibility of the four freedoms freedom of movement in goods, services, capital and persons.
As outlined above, free movement is a founding principle of the EU and thus fundamentally tied to the creation of the Single Market. Perhaps equally importantly, the EU has tended not to perceive free movement and migration in the same way as the UK. While EU free movement rules have been a toxic political issue in Britain for years, many on the Continent consider them a core achievement of the EU.
Continental Europeans do worry about migration, but mostly about migration and refugees arriving from outside the EU, rather than the movement of EU nationals within Europe. It should be noted that these fears have often been conflated, often deliberately. An example would be the poster depicting queues of Syrian refugees unfurled by Nigel Farage during the UK Referendum. But European leaders generally do not want an unfavourable Brexit outcome. It is plausible that the EU27 might agree to some free movement reform as part of the negotiation of a new UK-EU relationship, albeit reform would be much easier to negotiate in a scenario whereby the UK opted to stay within the EU.
In recent months a number of pro-European leaders have raised the possibility that free movement may need to be reformed. The relationship proposed would be based on an intergovernmental form of collaboration, with no legal right to free movement for workers but a regime of some controlled labour mobility and a contribution to the EU budget. The paper explores the question of whether it is possible to have close economic integration comparable to the Single Market while partly limiting labour mobility.
It concludes that whilst free movement serves a political function, from a purely economic viewpoint, goods, services and capital can be freely exchanged in a deeply integrated market without free movement of workers, though not entirely without some labour mobility. The aim of the Continental Partnership is to sustain deep economic integration, fully participating in goods, services, capital mobility and some temporary labour mobility, but excluding freedom of movement of workers and political integration. In summary, we believe a mutually beneficial compromise on free movement is possible.
Whether or not this is achieved will depend on the ability of the UK and EU27 to conduct Brexit negotiations not only with a clear view of their short-term goals but also of their long term interests and continuing interdependencies. Since the triggering of Article 50 in March , it has become clear that a number of pre-requisites exist to the successful negotiation of a successful compromise on free movement reform.
Indeed the UK has agreements for visa-free travel with over 50 non-EU countries at present, including Australia and Canada. In view of the link between free movement of persons and access to the Single Market, it is likely that new arrangements for future migration between the UK and the EU will not be finalised until the contours of the new UK-EU trading relationship have taken shape, which looks increasingly likely to take longer than the two years provided for in Article As the Shadow Brexit Secretary, Keir Starmer MP has recently acknowledged, this is likely to involve continuing with the current system of free movement for several years in exchange for continued access to the Single Market.
During the first six months of Brexit negotiations, the government have appeared to accept the logic of the Vote Leave campaign: that control over immigration can only be made possible by leaving the European Union and Single Market. This is a falsehood. Moreover, as set out in the previous chapter, the likelihood is that, even if Brexit were to go ahead as planned, the UK would continue to need to encourage most categories of EU migrants to keep coming, at least in the short-to-medium term, meaning the actual real life impact on immigration from Brexit is likely to be negligible.
Our starting point is therefore that the UK should seek to leave open the option of remaining within the EU, should the terms of departure turn out to be substantively worse than current arrangements and the British public change their minds.